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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, twenty-eight states offer no employment protections against
discrimination based on sexual orientation, three of which also have laws
barring the enactment or enforcement of local non-discrimination laws.1
This means fifty percent of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(“LGBT”) Americans live in states where they can be fired simply
because of whom they love or how they express themselves. 2 The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 shields employees from discrimination based on race,
religion, national origin, and “sex.”3 A lay person would assume the Civil
Rights Act’s protections would extend to LGBT Americans, but the term
“sex” has been construed narrowly by federal circuit courts to exclude
LGBT Americans.
In Section I, this Note will begin by discussing the history and past
applications of the Civil Rights Act’s term “sex” to demonstrate both the
growing impracticality and speciousness of maintaining the exclusion of
claims based on sexual orientation. Section II will flesh out the historic
assumptions regarding the etiology of homosexual attraction, underlying
the initial exclusion of claims based on sexual orientation and will show
how the shift in society’s understanding of sexual orientation has brought
about the realization that “sex” includes sexual orientation. Particularly,
Subsection A will show how, in 1964, homosexuals and “transsexuals”
were perceived as being mentally ill—a perception that has largely
eroded in the United States. Subsection B will show how cutting-edge
science is further revealing how sexuality is, at least to some degree,
biologically determined and inextricably linked to one’s gender. Finally,
Section III will demonstrate why the legislative history (Subsection A),
congressional failure to amend the Civil Rights Act (Subsection B), and
stare decisis (Subsection C) should serve as no impediment in
abandoning the narrow interpretation of “sex.”

1
Non-Discrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.Lgbtmap
org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws (last visited May 10, 2018). This number did not
change even following the Seventh Circuit’s landmark decision in Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty.
Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) and the Second Circuit’s decision in Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), because the six states in the Seventh and
Second Circuits already had protections against sexual orientation discrimination. Id.
2
Id.
3
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90) (“It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]”).
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II. HISTORIC INTERPRETATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE TERM “SEX”
A. Passage of the Civil Rights Act and the Birth of the Narrow
Interpretation of “Sex”
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“the Act”) is one of the most
significant milestones in employment protections.4 Title VII made it an
“unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”5 To enforce the Act’s prohibitions on discrimination,
Congress established the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
(“EEOC”) and empowered the courts to grant injunctive relief, back-pay,
compensatory and punitive damages, and to order any affirmative action
that may be deemed appropriate.6
But since the Act’s passage, courts have adopted a narrow
construction of the term “sex.”7 The sparse legislative history initially
suggested to most courts that the prohibition on “sex” discrimination was
added to the Act as a last-minute attempt to thwart the Act’s passage.8
This led courts to conclude, as most maintain today, that “Congress had
a narrow view of sex in mind when it passed the Civil Rights Act.”9 This
4
Cf. Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative
History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN &
L. 137, 161 (1997); Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U.L. REV.
995, 1006 (2015).
5
§ 2000e-2.
6
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(a), (g). See Lisa Bornstein & Megan Bench, Married on
Sunday, Fired on Monday: Approaches to Federal LGBT Civil Rights Protections, 22 WM. &
MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 31, 36 (2015).
7
Rachel Ostermant, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and the Public Think
Title VII’s Ban on Sex Discrimination Was an Accident, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 409, 426
(2009) (discussing how courts adopted a narrow interpretation of “sex” in Title VII due to the
legislative history which, to many, suggested “sex” was put into the Civil Rights Act in an
effort to defeat the Act’s passage entirely); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1086
(7th Cir. 1984) (“Congress had a narrow view of sex in mind when it passed the Civil Rights
Act, and it has rejected subsequent attempts to broaden the scope of its original interpretation.
For us to now hold that Title VII protects transsexuals would take us out of the realm of
interpreting and reviewing and into the realm of legislating.”).
8
John Davidson Miller III, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Is Actionable Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Is This the End of Horseplay as We Know it?, 29 SETON HALL
L. REV. 787, 790 (1998) (“There has been unanimously narrow interpretation of the term
“sex” and what constitutes sexual discrimination for Title VII purposes.”). See Jennifer L.
Nevins, Getting Dirty: A Litigation Strategy for Challenging Sex Discrimination Law by
Beginning with Transexualism, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 383, 413 (1998); Hively
v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir.
2017).
9
Compare Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (“‘Sex as a basis of discrimination was added as a
floor amendment one day before the House approved Title VII, without prior hearing or
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rendition of how “sex” came to be included as a class in the Act was aptly
summarized by the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania in 1973: “The suave and subtle Southerners in Congress
who put sex into the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [were] doubtless with the
hope of defeating the bill, but the strategy backfired and a giant step
towards ‘women’s lib’ was perhaps unintentionally taken[.]”10
The narrow interpretation of “sex” allowed various forms of
workplace discrimination to survive the Act’s passage.11 For example,
an employer could lawfully maintain a policy of hiring only single
women weighing less than 135 pounds, between the ages of twenty and
twenty-six, whom the employer also considered “attractive.”12 Courts
even rejected sexual harassment claims if the victim and harasser were
the same gender.13
These forms of discriminatory conduct, among others, have since
debate.’ This sex amendment was the gambit of a congressman seeking to scuttle adoption
of the Civil Rights Act. The ploy failed and sex discrimination was abruptly added to the
statute’s prohibition against race discrimination. The total lack of legislative history
supporting the sex amendment coupled with the circumstances of the amendment’s adoption
clearly indicates that Congress never considered nor intended that this 1964 legislation apply
to anything other than the traditional concept of sex. Had Congress intended more, surely the
legislative history would have at least mentioned its intended broad coverage of homosexuals,
transvestites, or transsexuals, and would no doubt have sparked an interesting debate.”)
(citations omitted), with Hively, 830 F.3d at 700 (“We also considered the legislative history
of Title VII, explaining that it was primarily meant to remedy racial discrimination, with sex
discrimination thrown in at the final hour in an attempt to thwart adoption of the Civil Rights
Act as a whole. Therefore, we concluded, ‘Congress had a narrow view of sex in mind when
it passed the Civil Rights Act.’”) (quoting Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086). But see Ostermant, supra
note 7, at 434 (“A number of scholars have criticized the continued use of the stock story,
arguing that the story is used to undermine the anti-discrimination command of the sex
provision. However, . . . the stock story has not always been cited to that effect. In some
cases courts explicitly relied on the stock story in order to constrict the application of the sex
discrimination ban. In other cases, however, courts were barely troubled by the same
supposed set of facts, showing a willingness to ensure equal employment opportunity.”).
10
Bradford v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 60 F.R.D. 434, 434 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
11
See Ostermant, supra note 7, at 426-27.
12
Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781, 782-83 (E.D. La. 1967) (“The
addition of ‘sex’ to the prohibition against discrimination based on race, religion or national
origin just sort of found its way into the equal employment opportunities section of the Civil
Rights Bill. . . . [T]he absence of legislative intent or the shortage of judicial precedent among
the states is no real problem in this case. By reading the act it is plain that Congress did not
ban discrimination in employment due to one’s marital status and that is the issue in this case.
Delta has a right to employ single females and to refuse to employ married females[.]”).
13
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“[W]hen the issue
arises in the context of a ‘hostile environment’ sexual harassment claim, the state and federal
courts have taken a bewildering variety of stances. Some, like the Fifth Circuit in this case,
have held that same-sex sexual harassment claims are never cognizable under Title VII.”).
See also Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (“Simply stated, the
defendant’s conduct [same-sex sexual harassment] was not the type of conduct Congress
intended to sanction when it enacted Title VII.”).
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been found by the Supreme Court to have been proscribed by the Act.14
But, when it comes to LGBT Americans,15 the narrow reading has
stubbornly survived and continues to deny employment protections for
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 16 Courts
maintained “sex discrimination” meant an unlawful action against
women because they are women and against men because they are men.17
The courts held a discrimination claim could only be predicated on the
physical characteristics of biological sex at birth.18 The classic example
14
Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Because no men
had the same duties as the stewardesses, the women could not complain that the no-marriage
rule applied solely to them. The Supreme Court’s decision in County of Washington v.
Gunther rejects that narrow reasoning.”) (citation omitted); Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79 (“We see
no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule excluding
same-sex harassment claims . . . male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But
statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed.”). E.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S.
542, 543-44 (1971) (reversing summary judgement against an employee who brought a sex
discrimination claim against an employer who refused to consider applications by women
with school-aged children).
15
“LGBT” stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender. This Note also uses the
abbreviation “LGB,” which stands for lesbian, gay, and bisexual.
16
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 853 F.3d
339 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Our precedent has been unequivocal in holding that Title VII does not
redress sexual orientation discrimination. That holding is in line with all other circuit courts
to have decided or opined about the matter.”). See Ostermant, supra note 7, at 428-29
(“Grossman v. Bernards Township Board of Education was typical among these cases in that
it concluded that ‘absentt [sic] of any legislative history indicating a congressional intent to
include transsexuals within the language of Title VII, the Court is reluctant to ascribe any
import to the term ‘sex’ other than its plain meaning.’ Therefore, the court held that
transsexuals were not covered under the sex provision.”). But see Roberts v. Clark Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1011-14, (D. Nev. 2016) (noting that the Seventh Circuit had
decided to rehear Hively, and Ulane, the case on which Hively heavily relied, was decided
before Price Waterhouse) (noting the Ninth Circuit held a transgender person could assert a
Title VII claim of sex discrimination based on their gender identity).
17
Hively, 830 F.3d at 700 (quoting Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th
Cir. 1984)); Darrell R. VanDeusen & Alexander P. Berg, VanDeusen and Berg on The
Developing Law of LGBT Protections Under Title VII, 2016 Emerging Issues 7459, *12-13
(“In other words, ‘the phrase in Title VII prohibiting discrimination based on ‘sex’ means that
it is unlawful to discriminate against women because they are women and against men
because they are men.’ These courts also highlighted that ‘[n]o mention is made of change
of sex or of sexual preference’ in the text of Title VII. Furthermore, given the sparse
legislative history concerning sex discrimination, courts at the time concluded that
‘[s]ituations involving transsexuals, homosexuals or bi-sexuals were simply not considered,
and from this void [courts are] not permitted to fashion [their] own judicial interdictions.’
Thus, as the Seventh Circuit explained in, ‘if the term ‘sex’ as it is used in Title VII is to mean
more than biological male or biological female, the new definition must come from
Congress.’”). But see Roberts, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 1011-14 (questioning whether or not gender
identity (i.e., not necessarily gender at birth) is encompassed in the Title VII).
18
Velma Cheri Gay, 50 Years Later. . .Still Interpreting the Meaning of ‘Because of Sex’
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is Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, where the Seventh Circuit, agreeing with
holdings in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, held “sex” did not include a
“diagnosed transsexual.”19 The court left it to Congress to adopt a
broader, “untraditional” definition of “sex.”20
From a modern perspective, the Seventh Circuit seemed to go
beyond the issue before it (i.e., whether “transsexuals” were entitled to
protections under the Act), and also held “sexual orientation” was also
not encompassed in the term “sex.”21 Arguably, this pivotal holding—
the nexus of the Seventh Circuit’s recently-abandoned exclusion of
sexual orientation from Title VII—was merely dicta with respect to
sexual orientation. But, as this Note will explain, courts and Americans
at large did not distinguish between sexual orientation and gender identity
at the time Ulane was decided—both were perceived to be related
pathologies.22 While some courts have recently questioned whether
gender identity is excluded from Title VII in light of Price Waterhouse
(discussed immediately below),23 the exclusion of gay, lesbian, and
bisexual individuals universally endured until recently and remains the
majority position.24
Within Title VII and Whether it Prohibits Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 73 A.F. L. REV.
61, 73-74 (2015) (“Initially, the courts defined ‘sex’ as merely biological sex and interpreted
the provision to only prohibit discrimination against biological men and women for being a
man or being a woman . . . . [A]n employee proving he or she was discriminated against
because of his or her sexual orientation remains a difficult challenge.”).
19
Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085-87.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 1085 (“While we recognize distinctions among homosexuals, transvestites, and
transsexuals, we believe that the same reasons for holding that the first two groups do not
enjoy Title VII coverage apply with equal force to deny protection for transsexuals.”).
22
See infra Sections II.A., II.B.
23
See Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 Fed. Appx. 883, 884 (11th Cir.
2016) (per curiam); but see Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of
Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 674-75 (W.D. Pa. 2015). The conflict between these cases
lay in whether the court finds discrimination based on someone’s transgender status
necessarily is “sex” discrimination. See Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th
Cir. 2005). This Note focuses primarily on sexual orientation discrimination—not gender
identity discrimination—because, while parts of this note have broader applicability, there are
substantive conceptual, legal, and historical differences between the treatment of transgender
Americans and sexual orientation minorities.
24
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 853 F.3d
339 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Our precedent has been unequivocal in holding that Title VII does not
redress sexual orientation discrimination. That holding is in line with all other circuit courts
to have decided or opined about the matter.”) (citing Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d
757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006); Medina v. Income Support Div., New Mexico, 413 F.3d 1131, 1135
(10th Cir. 2005); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001);
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe,
Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 75152 (4th Cir. 1996); U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 964
F.2d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th
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B. An Implicit Rebuke: Price Waterhouse Embraces the Theory of
“Sex Stereotypes”
Since Ulane, the Supreme Court has clarified the meaning and scope
of the term “sex” in the case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.25 In Price
Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins—who by all accounts was an “extremely
competent” professional with a “deft touch”—was denied a partnership
in the accounting firm and told that, to improve her chances of becoming
a partner, she should “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry.”26 Virtually all of the negative remarks about Hopkins’
performance related to her interpersonal skills, specifically her
brusqueness.27 Hopkins brought a Title VII sex discrimination claim
against Price Waterhouse and introduced evidence from a social
psychologist that the partnership selection process was likely influenced
by stereotypes based on gender.28 Judge Gehard A. Gesell, of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, found that “some of the
partners’ remarks about Hopkins stemmed from an impermissibly
cabined view of the proper behavior of women;” thus, Price Waterhouse
unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of sex.29 Decided
in 1989, the Supreme Court agreed with Judge Gesell, and held that the
term “sex” encompassed discrimination based on preconceived notions
of how women and men ought to act.30
Cases like Ann Hopkins’ are known as “mixed motive” cases.31 In
this type of case, the employer is partly motivated by a lawful
consideration and partly motivated by an unlawful consideration.32 Using
Price Waterhouse as the example, it is perfectly lawful to deny a
promotion to someone because of her brusqueness, but it is unlawful to
Cir. 1989); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979)). See Hively, 853 F.3d
at 346. But see, EEOC v. Scott Med. Health Ctr., P.C., 217 F. Supp. 3d 834, 842 (W.D. Pa.
2016) (holding discrimination based on sexual orientation is a subset of sexual stereotyping
and thus covered by Title VII).
25
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 n.9 (1989) (“In saying that gender
played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer
at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response,
one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.
In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that
a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”).
26
Id. at 231-34.
27
Id. at 234-35.
28
Id. at 235.
29
Id. at 236-37.
30
Id. at 250-51.
31
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003).
32
Id. at 94-95.
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deny only women promotions because they act brusquely. The Court
found Hopkins’ brusqueness would not have been an issue if she was a
man and the disparate treatment she suffered stemmed from her
employer’s preconceived notions of how women ought to behave;
therefore, Hopkins’ sex was a “motivating factor” in her employer’s
decision to pass her over for a promotion and, thus, unlawful under Title
VII.33
Price Waterhouse, among other cases, is a rebuke of the narrow
interpretation of “sex” by the Supreme Court; yet the lower courts have
remained obdurate in abandoning the narrow interpretation and its
reasoning, if only to exclude LGB Americans from garnering federal
employment protections.34 The narrow interpretation lives on for the
same three reasons it was created: (1) the legislative history surrounding
the inclusion of the term “sex”; (2) repeated failed attempts of Congress
to amend Title VII and broaden “sex” to include discrimination based on
“affectional or sexual orientation”; and (3) that, in absence of any
congressional indication to the contrary, the court should adhere to the
“traditional” definition of “sex” (i.e., stare decisis).35
In Price Waterhouse, the Court opined that the prohibition on sex

33

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237, 250-51.
Compare id., and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“We
see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule excluding
same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII. As some courts have observed,
male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed.”), with Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d,
853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[The EEOC] concluded that ‘sexual orientation discrimination
is sex discrimination because it necessarily entails treating an employee less favorably
because of the employee’s sex.’ . . . Whatever deference we might owe to the EEOC’s
adjudications, we conclude for the reasons that follow, that Title VII, as it stands, does not
reach discrimination based on sexual orientation.” (citations omitted)).
35
Compare Hively, 830 F.3d at 700-02 (“[Title VII] was primarily meant to remedy
racial discrimination, with sex discrimination thrown in at the final hour in an attempt to
thwart adoption of the Civil Rights Act as a whole. Therefore, we concluded, ‘Congress had
a narrow view of sex in mind when it passed the Civil Rights Act.’ . . . We are presumptively
bound by our own precedent in Hamner, Spearman, Muhammad, Hamm, Schroeder, and
Ulane . . . . Our holdings and those of other courts reflect the fact that despite multiple efforts,
Congress has repeatedly rejected legislation that would have extended Title VII to cover
sexual orientation.”), with De Santis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 332-33 (9th Cir.
1979) (“Recently the Fifth Circuit similarly read the legislative history of Title VII and
concluded that Title VII thus does not protect against discrimination because of effeminacy.
We agree and hold that discrimination because of effeminacy, like discrimination because of
homosexuality or transsexualism, does not fall within the purview of Title VII . . . . Congress
did not and has consistently refused to include homosexuals as a group within the special
protection of Title VII.” (citation omitted)).
34
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discrimination was intended to make gender irrelevant in employment
decisions.36 By implicitly adopting a broader reading of the term “sex,”
the Court explained that it took the congressional statements in the
context of race as general statements on the meaning of Title VII. 37 This
reading is incompatible with rulings that cite the legislative history of the
term “sex” as suggesting Congress intended only a narrow
interpretation.38 “Sex” had been added to the Act a day before its passage
in the House of Representatives seemingly in an attempt to sabotage the
bill.39 But the Supreme Court was not persuaded by arguments that this
“somewhat bizarre path” by which “sex” came to be included in the Act
precluded the Court from considering congressional statements about
race in cases of sex discrimination.40 The Court considered congressional
statements about the statute’s intent to eliminate even subtle
discrimination based on race and applied it to sex discrimination.41 In
Price Waterhouse, the Court vastly expanded protections against sex
discrimination by holding claims of discrimination based on
nonconformity with gender stereotypes was cognizable under Title VII,
tacitly endorsing a broad reading of the term “sex.”42
Further suggesting “sex” should be interpreted broadly, the Supreme
Court again read the term broadly in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs. when the Court addressed whether sex discrimination under the
Act included same-sex harassment.43 Joseph Oncale brought a sexual
harassment claim based on sexual assaults and threats of rape made by
two other male employees.44 The district court granted summary
judgement for the respondent-employer finding a male could not assert a
36

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239-40 (“We take these words to mean that gender
must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”).
37
Id. at 244 n.9.
38
Hively, 830 F.3d at 700 (“We also considered the legislative history of Title VII,
explaining that it was primarily meant to remedy racial discrimination, with sex
discrimination thrown in at the final hour in an attempt to thwart adoption of the Civil Rights
Act as a whole. Therefore, we concluded, ‘Congress had a narrow view of sex in mind when
it passed the Civil Rights Act.’”) (quoting Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1086
(7th Cir. 1984)).
39
Id.
40
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239-40, 244 n.9 (“We take these words to mean that
gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”).
41
Id. at 243, 244 n.9.
42
Zachary R. Herz, Price’s Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for
Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396, 403 (2016).
43
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 76, 79 (“This case presents
the question whether workplace harassment can violate Title VII’s prohibition against
‘discrimination . . . because of . . . sex,’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), when the harasser and the
harassed employee are of the same sex.”).
44
Id. at 76-77.
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claim of sexual harassment against another male under Title VII. 45 In
overruling that interpretation, the Court stated that, while same-sex
sexual harassment was clearly not the principal evil that concerned
Congress when drafting the Civil Rights Act, “statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal
concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”46
Conceivably, the “sex stereotyping” theory should have opened the
door to causes of action for employment discrimination based on gender
non-conforming behavior, including non-conforming private romantic or
sexual behavior.47 This would have seen the inclusion of LGBT people
within the Act’s protections but has not been the case.48 While
homosexual activity is, by definition, gender non-conforming behavior,
courts feared that allowing homosexuals to bring sex stereotyping claims
would “bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII[,]”
effectively amending the Act.49 This problematic distinction between
“sex” and sexual orientation has led to significant issues in application,
including divided approaches between the circuits, peculiar results, and
court-sanctioned discrimination against LGB people (echoing longabandoned conceptions of homosexuality and bisexuality as voluntary
deviancy).50
45

Id. at 77.
Id. at 79.
47
Ian Ayres & Richard Luedeman, Tops, Bottoms, and Versatiles: What Straight Views
of Penetrative Preferences Could Mean for Sexuality Claims Under Price Waterhouse, 123
YALE L.J. 714, 720 (2013).
48
E.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001).
49
Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 47, at 721-22 (quoting Simonton, 232 F.3d at 38).
50
E.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he line
between sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination ‘because of sex’ can be difficult
to draw.”); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066-67 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Posner, J., concurring) (“The case law as it has evolved holds, . . . that although Title VII
does not protect homosexuals from discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation, it
protects heterosexuals who are victims of ‘sex stereotyping’ or ‘gender stereotyping.’ . . . The
origin of this curious distinction, which would be very difficult to explain to a lay person (an
indication, often and I think here, that the law is indeed awry), is the Supreme Court’s decision
in [Price Waterhouse.] . . . If a court of appeals requires lawyers presenting oral argument to
wear conservative business dress, should a male lawyer have a legal right to argue in drag
provided that the court does not believe that he is a homosexual, against whom it is free to
discriminate? That seems to me a very strange extension of the Hopkins case.”). See Ayres
& Luedeman, supra note 47, at 722-24 (“One approach is to treat gender stereotyping and
sexual-orientation discrimination as mutually exclusive. . . . A second approach gives more
serious consideration to so-called mixed-motive analysis.”). See Brian Soucek, Perceived
Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM. U.L. REV. 715, 766 (2014)
(“Plaintiffs who ‘look gay’ succeed under Title VII while those merely known or thought to
be gay do not.”). See id. at 784-85 (stating the current court holdings excluding sexual
46
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C. Modern Conceptual Issues: A Line So Difficult to Draw
Because It No Longer Exists
The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have all
commented on the incoherence of trying to distinguish “sex”
discrimination from discrimination based on sexual orientation.51 Since
Price Waterhouse, courts have inconsistently tried drawing lines between
the two types of claims with limited success.52 When looking broadly at
the resulting applications, courts have taken at least two approaches in
adjudicating claims of sex stereotyping when those claims involve sexual
orientation.53 And, as Brian Soucek showed in his analysis of 117 cases
involving gender stereotyping, in trying to tease apart these “separate”
claims, courts have implicitly endorsed a distinction between stereotypic
homosexuals and those simply thought or believed to be homosexual—
affording only the former category some protection under the Act albeit
limited.54
Since Price Waterhouse, some LGB employees have been able to
use the sex stereotyping theory to successfully assert a claim of sex
discrimination under Title VII.55 But courts have gone through great
pains to try to separate sex stereotyping claims from those based on
sexual orientation, a distinction this note argues is no longer cognizable
due the fact most judges no longer view homosexual attraction as a literal

orientation perpetuates prejudice including (1) “disgust,” (2) the idea homosexuals are trying
to gain special rights, and (3) that homosexuals are an “outgroup”).
51
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 121 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Lower courts . . .
have long labored to distinguish between gender stereotypes that support an inference of
impermissible sex discrimination and those that are indicative of sexual orientation
discrimination.”); Prowel, 579 F.3d at 291 (“[T]he line between sexual orientation
discrimination and discrimination ‘because of sex’ can be difficult to draw.”); Hively v. Ivy
Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Our panel described the line
between a gender nonconformity claim and one based on sexual orientation as gossamer-thin;
we conclude that it does not exist at all.”).
52
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 853 F.3d
339 (7th Cir. 2017) (“And so for the last quarter century since Price Waterhouse, courts have
been haphazardly, and with limited success, trying to figure out how to draw the line between
gender norm discrimination . . . and sexual orientation discrimination”).
53
Id. at 704.
54
Soucek, supra note 50, at 748 (“Prowel and Vickers both involved perceived
homosexuality, but ‘perceived’ had different meanings in the two cases. Prowel looked gay,
at least in the eyes of his coworkers and, it seems, the Third Circuit. Vickers was thought to
be gay. The fact that Prowel won and Vickers lost is not unusual.”).
55
Hively, 830 F.3d at 704 (“As a result of Price Waterhouse, a line of cases emerged in
which courts began to recognize claims from gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
employees who framed their Title VII sex discrimination claims in terms of discrimination
based on gender non-conformity (which we also refer to, interchangeably, as sex stereotype
discrimination) and not sexual orientation.”).
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infirmity.56 The first approach taken by some courts forgoes any attempt
to discover whether the employer’s discriminatory conduct was based on
gender stereotypes or perceived sexual orientation.57 If the employer’s
discriminatory behavior was in any way based on the perpetrator’s
perception of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation, the plaintiff’s claim
fails.58 This is because courts following this approach hold sex
stereotyping claims and claims based on sexual orientation mutually
exclusive.59 These courts reasoned that, while the plaintiff may exhibit
gender non-conforming behavior unrelated to his or her sexual
orientation, the behavior was simply a means for the employer to draw
conclusions about the plaintiff’s sexuality and, thus, the true object of the
employer’s discrimination was the plaintiff’s perceived sexual
orientation—a form of discrimination that Title VII does not proscribe.60
Other courts take a different approach.61 Instead of throwing out any
case intimating sexual orientation, these courts endeavor to untangle the
perpetrator’s motive.62 Even if the plaintiff is a homosexual, he or she
may succeed so long as the employer’s discrimination was motivated by
gender non-conforming behavior unrelated to sexual proclivity. 63 Once
an employee establishes a prima facie case for discrimination based on
sex stereotypes, the onus is on the employer to raise the affirmative
56

Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 47, at 722. See Soucek, supra note 50, at 766 (“The
cases surveyed . . . suggest that rather than trying to separate the gender stereotyping wheat
from the homosexual chaff, courts instead distinguish between two types of stereotypes: those
violated visibly and those whose violations are cognitively perceived. Or, given the blurring
of categories just endorsed, this distinction might be rephrased in terms of sexuality rather
than stereotyping. Plaintiffs who ‘look gay’ succeed under Title VII while those merely
known or thought to be gay do not. Courts resist this description.”).
57
Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 47, at 722 (“But once some courts decide that a
plaintiff’s sexual orientation was in play, they often altogether refuse to allow the plaintiff to
frame his or her complaints in terms of gender stereotyping.”). See Soucek, supra note 50, at
722.
58
Id. See Hively, 830 F.3d at 706 (“For example, some courts attempting to differentiate
between actions which constitute discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and those
which constitute discrimination on the basis of gender non-conformity essentially throw out
the baby with the bathwater.”).
59
See Soucek, supra note 50, at 722. See also Hively, 830 F.3d at 706.
60
Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 47, at 722 (“The court could reach such a conclusion
by inferring that the nonsexual traits were merely the means by which the employer made
inferences about the plaintiff’s sexuality, or that the nonsexual traits were eclipsed in salience
by the plaintiff’s sexuality.”). See Soucek, supra note 50, at 722.
61
See Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 47, at 722-23.
62
Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 47, at 723.
63
Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 47, at 723 (“A second approach gives more serious
consideration to so-called mixed-motive analysis. The court entertains the possibility that,
although the plaintiff may have been known or assumed to be bi/homosexual, the employer
still could have been responding, at least in substantial part, to the plaintiff’s nonsexual
gender-nonconformity.”).
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defense that it would have taken the same action for some other, lawful
reason—which, under the current prevailing conception of “sex,”
includes the plaintiff’s sexual orientation as a lawful motive for
discrimination.64
While not as objectionable, the second approach is far from
laudable.65 An employer’s affirmative defense could very well be “yes I
fired John Doe because he’s effeminate (unlawful under Title VII’s sex
stereotyping theory), but that’s okay because I would have fired him
anyway because I thought he was a fag.”66 And—as it stands—most
federal courts would give effect to such a defense.67 The narrow
interpretation of “sex” has implicitly allowed courts to add discrimination
against homosexuals as an affirmative defense to claims of
discrimination. Plaintiffs in these cases would have the burden to prove
the employer’s “legitimate non-discriminatory reason” for taking an
adverse employment action against the plaintiff (i.e., that the employer
was discriminating against the employee because of her sexuality) was
pretextual and the true object of the employer’s discrimination was her
other gender non-conforming behaviors.68 Furthermore, employees will
not succeed under the mixed motive approach, so long as the illicit motive
is coextensive with the permissible one (although this defies the language
of the Act).69
Surprisingly, in cases where sexuality is unknown or not raised, the
prevailing interpretation of the Act tends to sustain claims by plaintiffs
who conform to overtly stereotypical homosexual behaviors (e.g.,
feminine mannerisms in a man or an “Ellen DeGeneres kind of look” in

64

Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 47, at 723.
This Author, of course, is assuming that everyone, from right to left—though they may
disagree on matters of marriage and faith—support the ideal that everyone should be free from
on-the-job harassment.
66
Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 47, at 723-24.
67
Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 47, at 723-24.
68
Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (requiring a fair
opportunity for the plaintiff to show that an employer’s stated reason was in fact pretext for
unlawful discrimination).
69
Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 47, at 724. Compare, e.g., Centola v. Potter, 183 F.
Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) (“A mixed motive approach is important here, precisely
because of the difficulty in differentiating behavior that is prohibited (discrimination on the
basis of sex) from behavior that is not prohibited (discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation) . . . . The harasser may discriminate against an openly gay co-worker, or a coworker that he perceives to be gay, whether effeminate or not, because he thinks, ‘real men
don’t date men.’”), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90)
(“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates
that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”) (emphasis added).
65
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a woman).70 Brian Soucek’s survey distinguished between two types of
sex stereotyping claims: (1) “visible stereotypes” and (2) “cognized
stereotypes.”71 In cases involving the first type—visible stereotypes—
the plaintiff exhibits gender nonconforming behavior other than sexual
proclivity, but either sexual orientation is never at issue or the court is
willing to try and untangle the primary motivation behind the
discrimination.72 The implications of these holdings are curious. For
example, it would be (or is) unlawful for an employer to fire its
homosexual employees only if they act flamboyantly, but perfectly lawful
to simply fire all homosexual employees.73
In Soucek’s second type of claim—those involving cognized
stereotypes—homosexual employees fare much worse.74 These are cases
where the claimed harassment stemmed from someone’s knowledge or
belief about the plaintiff’s sexual orientation.75 Of the thirty-six cases
Soucek analyzed from this species, only one plaintiff succeeded.76
Soucek concluded that distinguishing between sex stereotyping and
sexual orientation is not only conceptually untenable but, in light of his
data, also “descriptively inaccurate.”77 His research showed that courts
are distinguishing between the ways in which gender stereotypes
concerning sexual orientation are perceived, which is inconsistent with
the application of Title VII in other contexts. 78 For example, courts
would make no distinction between an employer’s discriminatory
conduct, whether motivated by his belief that a female employee had
children (“cognized”), or motivated by his knowledge after seeing a
picture of her children on her desk (“visible”).79 In either circumstance
the female employee would be afforded no lesser protection.80
The flaw in the current conception of “sex” discrimination is not just
in its inconsistent approaches between the circuits or difficultly in
70

Soucek, supra note 50, at 749-50.
Soucek, supra note 50, at 748, 755.
72
Soucek, supra note 50, at 748-55.
73
See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 709 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 853 F.3d
339 (7th Cir. 2017) (“We recognize that doing so creates an uncomfortable result in which
the more visibly and stereotypically gay or lesbian a plaintiff is in mannerisms, appearance,
and behavior, and the more the plaintiff exhibits those behaviors and mannerisms at work, the
more likely a court is to recognize a claim of gender non-conformity which will be cognizable
under Title VII as sex discrimination.”).
74
Soucek, supra note 50, at 756.
75
Soucek, supra note 50, at 755.
76
Soucek, supra note 50, at 756.
77
Soucek, supra note 50, at 718.
78
Soucek, supra note 50, at 718.
79
Soucek, supra note 50, at 718.
80
Soucek, supra note 50, at 718.
71
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application, but also in the logical inconsistencies (exemplified above) in
the application of Title VII. This becomes clear when one looks to other
Title VII precedent regarding affectional or associational discrimination.
Employer policies that discriminate based on marital status only violate
Title VII if they treat women differently from men or the inverse. 81 For
example, it would be lawful for an employer to have a blanket no
marriage-policy, but would be unlawful to maintain a no-marriage policy
only for female employees.82 One would likely assume the affectional
protections of Title VII would apply to LGB Americans too—but, for
some reason (identified and discussed in Part II infra), they have not,
despite the fact such employment decisions inherently consider gender.83
To illustrate, it is unlawful for an employer to maintain a no-marriage
policy only for its female employees, but it is lawful for an employer to
terminate female employees for having wives despite the fact that the
employer would not fire its male employees for having wives.84 In a postObergefell era, we have yet to see if the traditional exclusion of “sexual
orientation” from Title VII protections will survive.85 But division has
been growing among the district courts and—with the Seventh Circuit’s
en banc decision in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana and
the Second Circuit’s en banc decision in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.—
among the circuit courts.86
81

Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 1221, 1225-26 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff’d,
633 F2d 864 (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 US 971 (1981) (“It should be noted that a
discrimination claim based on marital status relies on a showing of disparate treatment
between the sexes. For example, an employer’s ban on hiring people who are married may
not be unlawful, but a ban on hiring married women would be because the policy is premised
on gender differences.”); accord Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt., 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th
Cir. 1997) (“Title VII prohibits employers from treating married women differently than
married men, but it does not protect marital status alone.”).
82
Id.
83
Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 208-09 (“As a matter of definition, if the same
conduct is prohibited or stigmatized when engaged in by a person of one sex, while it is
tolerated when engaged in by a person of the other sex, then the party imposing the prohibition
or stigma is discriminating on the basis of sex.”).
84
Compare Foray v. Bell Atl., 56 F. Supp. 2d 327, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding
homosexuals cannot legally marry, and therefore disparate employee-benefits policies is not
an unlawful employment practice), with Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08
(2015) (“The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental
right to marry in all States.”).
85
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 131 (2d Cir. 2018) (“In the context of
Title VII, the statutory prohibition extends to all discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ and
sexual orientation discrimination is an actionable subset of sex discrimination.”); Evans v.
Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding sexual orientation
discrimination is not ‘sex’ discrimination under Title VII). See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608
(“They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”).
86
Compare Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 598, 620 (S.D.N.Y.

CARACAPPA

352

2018

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

Similarly frustrated with the incongruent approaches, the EEOC has
abandoned the distinction.87 While addressing both the legislative history
and failed attempts to legislatively cure the perceived deficiencies of the
Act, the EEOC took the position that “[s]exual orientation discrimination
is sex discrimination because it necessarily entails treating an employee
less favorably because of the employee’s sex.”88 Following the decision,
the United States District Court for the Central District of California
echoed the sentiment and adopted the holding stating: “[T]he line
between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is
‘difficult to draw’ because that line does not exist, save as a lingering and
faulty judicial construct.”89
Since the EEOC’s decision, three circuit courts have addressed the
issue.90 In October 2016, the Seventh Circuit questioned whether the line
between discrimination based on “sex” and sexual orientation existed, but
maintained the exclusion of homosexuals from the protection of Title VII
due to binding precedent.91 In March 2017, the Eleventh Circuit also
rested on precedent, but a dissenting judge sided with the EEOC, finding
discrimination based on sexual orientation necessarily is “sex”
2016) (“The lesson imparted by the body of Title VII litigation concerning sexual orientation
discrimination and sexual stereotyping seems to be that no coherent line can be drawn
between these two sorts of claims. Yet the prevailing law in this Circuit — and, indeed, every
Circuit to consider the question — is that such a line must be drawn.”), and Hinton v. Va.
Union Univ., 185 F. Supp. 3d 807, 817 (E.D. Va. 2016) (“In sum, Title VII does not
encompass sexual orientation discrimination claims, and cannot be supplanted by the merely
persuasive power of the EEOC’s decision.”), with Winstead v. Lafayette County Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’r, No. 1:16CV00054-MW-GRJ, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80036, at *26-27 (N.D. Fla.
2016) (“This view—that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is necessarily
discrimination based on gender or sex stereotypes, and is therefore sex discrimination—is
persuasive to this Court, as it has been to numerous other courts and the EEOC.”). Compare
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 351 (7th Cir. 2017) (“We hold only
that a person who alleges that she experienced employment discrimination on the basis of her
sexual orientation has put forth a case of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes.”), Zarda,
883 F.3d at 121, and Evans, 850 F.3d at 1261 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting), with Evans, 850
F.3d at 1255 (explaining how binding precedent forecloses a Title VII action for sexual
orientation discrimination).
87
Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *8 (EEOC July 15, 2015)
(“Indeed, many courts have gone to great lengths to distinguish adverse employment actions
based on ‘sex’ from adverse employment actions based on ‘sexual orientation.’ The stated
justification for such intricate parsing of language has been the bare conclusion that ‘Title VII
does not prohibit . . . discrimination because of sexual orientation.’”).
88
Id. at *5.
89
Videckis v. Perpperdine Univ., No. CV 15-00298 DDP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
169187, at *16 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
90
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2016); Evans, 850 F.3d at
1257; Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 200-01.
91
Hively, 830 F.3d at 703 (“Whatever deference we might owe to the EEOC’s
adjudications, we conclude for the reasons that follow, that Title VII, as it stands, does not
reach discrimination based on sexual orientation.”).
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discrimination under Title VII.92 Later that same month, the Chief Judge
of the Second Circuit, concurring in result and joined by another judge
on the three-judge panel, similarly found sexual orientation
discrimination necessarily established a claim for sex discrimination
under Title VII.93 In the meantime, the Seventh Circuit reheard Hively
en banc and, in April 2017, became the first circuit court to hold
discrimination based on sexual orientation is sex discrimination under
Title VII.94 In February 2018, the Second Circuit joined the Seventh and
held sexual orientation discrimination was a subset of “sex”
discrimination prohibited by Title VII.95
What is perhaps most telling about the EEOC’s pivotal decision is
the agency’s citation to the American Psychiatric Association’s definition
of sexual orientation.96 Though likely intended to be merely illustrative
that the definitions of “gay” and “lesbian” include gender, the need for
clarifying the meaning of sexual orientation is understandable given the
tremendous and rapid evolution of our understanding of the concept. This
Note hypothesizes that the current exclusion of sexual orientation from
Title VII protections is a vestige of eroded assumptions about the etiology
homosexual attraction.97 The proceeding section develops this point and
92
93
94
95
96

Evans, 850 F.3d at 1257, 1261.
Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 201-04.
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 351-52 (7th Cir. 2017).
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 131 (2d Cir. 2018).
See Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (EEOC July 15,

2015).
97

Judge Posner suggested the same in his concurrence in Hively. Hively, 853 F.3d at
353 (“It is well-nigh certain that homosexuality, male or female, did not figure in the minds
of the legislators who enacted Title VII. I had graduated from law school two years before
the law was enacted. Had I been asked then whether I had ever met a male homosexual, I
would have answered: probably not; had I been asked whether I had ever met a lesbian I
would have answered ‘only in the pages of À la recherche du temps perdu.’ Homosexuality
was almost invisible in the 1960s. It became visible in the 1980s as a consequence of the
AIDS epidemic; today it is regarded by a large swathe of the American population as normal.
But what is certain is that the word ‘sex’ in Title VII had no immediate reference to
homosexuality; many years would elapse before it could be understood to include
homosexuality. A diehard ‘originalist’ would argue that what was believed in 1964 defines
the scope of the statute for as long as the statutory text remains unchanged, and therefore until
changed by Congress’s amending or replacing the statute. But as I noted earlier, statutory and
constitutional provisions frequently are interpreted on the basis of present need and
understanding rather than original meaning.”). Judge Posner goes farther than many would
tolerate. Id. at 352-53 (“Finally and most controversially, interpretation can mean giving a
fresh meaning to a statement (which can be a statement found in a constitutional or statutory
text. . . . And a common form of interpretation it is, despite its flouting ‘original meaning.’”).
This note demonstrates how the meaning of “sex” has not changed, but the American
understanding of sexuality has. In fact, the narrow reading of the class dishonors the 88th
Congress’s original intention to create broad classes of protection and eliminate gender as an
employment consideration. See infra Section III.B.
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illustrates why maintaining the exclusion of sexual orientation serves
only to preserve discrimination and perpetuate stale assumptions
debunked by science and overturned by social progress. What it will
show is that the definition of “sex” has not shifted—society’s
understanding of sexuality has changed. In other words, the inclusion of
sexual orientation discrimination in the ambit of “sex” discrimination is
not a reinterpretation of the class, but a reexamination of the facts and
circumstances to which Title VII’s proscription of “sex” discrimination
is applied.
III. THE PERCEIVED SCOPE OF “SEX” AND THE ETIOLOGY OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION
A. The Evolution in Psychology
The true impediment to the inclusion of sexual orientation
discrimination within the meaning of “sex” discrimination is the
anachronistic assumptions underlying the original exclusion from Title
VII’s protections.98 Specifically, it was the historic assumptions
regarding the etiology of homosexual attraction (i.e., that such attraction
was caused by demonic corruption or a psychiatric or medical
condition)99 that was responsible for its initial exclusion from Title VII’s
protections. By continuing to exclude sexual orientation from the ambit
of “sex” discrimination, courts are clinging to and perpetuating these
assumptions, which have been displaced by considerable scientific and
social advancement.100 The distinction between discrimination based on
sex stereotypes and discrimination based on sexual orientation is so
difficult for judges to perceive, because judges today do not share the
same worldview or assumptions common in 1964 when the Civil Rights
Act was drafted.101 Today, there is simply no logical distinction between
98
See Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, 5 BEHAV. SCI. 565,
568 (2015). Cf. Robert Epstein, Do Gays Have a Choice?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN MIND. June
2009, at 63 (“It is difficult for most people to think objectively about homosexuality, in large
part because biases against it are literally of biblical proportions.”).
99
Epstein supra note 98, at 63.
100
See Soucek, supra note 50, at 784-85 (stating the current court holdings excluding
sexual orientation perpetuates prejudice including (1) disgust, (2) the idea homosexuals are
trying to gain special rights, and (3) that homosexuals are an “outgroup”).
101
See Videckis v. Perpperdine Univ., No. CV 15-00298 DDP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
169187, at *16 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“Simply put, the line between sex discrimination and sexual
orientation discrimination is ‘difficult to draw’ because that line does not exist, save as a
lingering and faulty judicial construct.”); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 706
(7th Cir. 2016) (“Whether the line is nonexistent or merely exceedingly difficult to find, it is
certainly true that the attempt to draw and observe a line between the two types of
discrimination results in a jumble of inconsistent precedents.”); Jeremiah Garretson &
Elizabeth Suhay, Scientific Communication about Biological Influences on Homosexuality
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discrimination based on “sex” and discrimination based on sexual
orientation.102
For the majority of American and Western history, homosexual
activity fell solely within the purview of religion.103 Most religions
deemed homosexuality morally corrupt—an idea that not only survived
the religious skepticism of the Enlightenment, but evolved to find a new
home in secular thought.104 In 1886, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, a German
psychiatrist, wrote the Psychopathia Sexualis, which theorized that some
people might be born with homosexual inclinations and that these
inclinations should be viewed as a congenital disease, a defect, contrary
to the laws of Darwinian natural selection.105 Counterposing his own
theory, the much extolled founder of psychology, Sigmund Freud, put
forward the influential idea that homosexuality was caused by arrested
and the Politics of Gay Rights, 69 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 17, 25 (2016) (“In sum,
analyses of two overtime datasets demonstrate that, in the wake of the American media’s
focus in the early 1990s on biological causes of homosexuality and their progressive
implications, public opinion in the United States changed in substantial ways. First, an
increasing commitment to the belief that homosexuals are born gay was concentrated among
liberals in the 1990s, particularly educated liberals. Moderates adopted this belief at a lower
rate, while conservatives appeared to dismiss evidence for biological influences on
homosexuality. These patterns suggest that ideologically biased assimilation of scientific
communication about homosexuality was occurring among both liberals and conservatives
during the period we examine. Second, Americans who believed homosexuality to be innate
shortly after the spike in ‘born gay’ messages became more progressive on gay rights over
time, suggesting that altered causal attributions contributed to progressive changes in societal
attitudes toward lesbians and gays during the 1990s. Third, together, these two empirical
patterns appeared to contribute to left–right attitude differences over gay rights during the
1990s.”). Cf. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (“There can be no doubt
that the conduct allegedly engaged in by Simonton’s co-workers is morally reprehensible
whenever and in whatever context it occurs, particularly in the modern workplace.”).
102
See Videckis, No. CV 15-00298 DDP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169187, at *16. See
also Hively, 830 F.3d at 706. Cf. Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35.
103
Drescher, supra note 98, at 568. See Richard Weinmeyer, The Decriminalization of
Sodomy in the United States, 16 AM. MED. ASS’N J. OF ETHICS 916, 916 (2014) (explaining
nineteenth century U.S. sodomy laws were enacted to protect women, “weak men,” and
children against sexual assault, and court records from that time show consenting adults who
engaged in sodomy within their homes were considered immune from prosecution); Sodomy
and Homosexuality in Medieval Europe, HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY: EARTH
EDITION, https://h2g2.com/edited_entry/A7715315 (explaining homosexual activity was not
considered a legal issue until the thirteenth century, and even then prosecutions were rare for
men and nearly nonexistent for women).
104
Drescher, supra note 98, at 568; see Epstein, supra note 98 (“Thousands of American
pulpits to this day repeat the old biblical injunctions, which fuel discomfort with
homosexuality at every layer of our society.”); see generally Jessie Szalay, What Was the
Enlightenment?, LIVESCIENCE, https://www.livescience.com/55327-the-enlightenment.html
(last visited May 10, 2018) (explaining the Enlightenment was a period in Europe and North
America marked by a shift towards rational thought and religious skepticism, and also saw
the development of the scientific method).
105
Drescher, supra note 98, at 568.
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sexual development.106 Freud himself held a pessimistic view about the
success of converting homosexuals into heterosexuals, but the
community of optimistic psychoanalysts who took up Freud’s mantle
after his death in 1939 believed homosexuality was not only pathological
(and likely the product of bad parenting), but curable.107 These ideas
were influential, and saw the inclusion of homosexuality in the first
Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM-I), published in 1952, as a
“sociopathic personality disturbance.”108 It was later reclassified in
1968—four years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act—as a “sexual
deviation,”
which
included
necrophilia,
pedophilia,
and
transsexualism.109
A few psychologists, most notably Alfred Kinsey and Evelyn
Hooker, published works suggesting homosexuality was a natural
deviation and not indicative of psychological disturbance.110 Yet the
American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) ignored the then-nascent but
growing body of research as it conflicted with the prevailing conceptions
and theories on the origin of homosexual attraction.111 Even many gay
activists bought into the pathological theory of homosexuality—
genuinely working with the psychiatric community to find a cure.112
Following the Stonewall Riots in 1969, LGBT activists protested the
annual meetings of the APA because they believed the APA was a major
source of the social stigma that plagued them.113 These protests, along
106

Drescher, supra note 98, at 568-69.
Drescher, supra note 98, at 569.
108
Drescher, supra note 98, at 569.
109
Drescher, supra note 98, at 569; THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS [hereinafter DSM-II], § 302 (Am. Psychiatric Ass’n 2d ed.) (1968).
110
Drescher, supra note 98, at 569-70.
111
Drescher, supra note 98, at 570.
112
Drescher, supra note 98, at 570. See, e.g., Michael M. Miller, Hypnotic-Aversion
Treatment of Homosexuality, J. NAT’L MED. ASSOC. 411, 415 (1963). Well-meaning people
still seek a cure. See, e.g., Zoë Schlanger, JONAH, the Largest Jewish Gay Conversion
Therapy Organization, Takes Its Last Breath, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 18, 2005, 1:44 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/life-and-death-jewish-exgay-therapy-organization-406898 (“On
a trip home for Passover, [Unger] finally told his parents about his attraction to men. It went
better than he expected. They were ‘extremely loving,’ but just as confused as he was about
how to proceed. One rabbi said it might be a chemical imbalance, and that Unger should seek
medical attention. Another was sure Unger would live a happy enough life if he just found a
wife who could cook really well. Eventually, Unger’s father gave him the number for ‘Rabbi
Arthur Goldberg.’ Two to four years, Goldberg told Unger over the phone. That’s how long
it would take for JONAH’s program to turn him from gay to straight, if he just put in the
work . . . . Putting in the work, it turned out, meant beating a pillow effigy of his mother with
a tennis racket until his hands bled, screaming ‘Mom!’ with each blow. It meant cutting off
contact with his mother for several months . . . .”).
113
Drescher, supra note 98, at 570. See Epstein, supra note 98, at 63 (“It was largely
gays themselves—understandably tired of being viewed as freaks of nature—who began to
107
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with internal pressures, changing demographics, and a growing climate
of public distrust towards psychiatry following renewed criticisms over
“drapetomania” (a psychological “disorder” diagnosed in slaves “who
[had] a tendency to run away from their owner due to an inborn
propensity for wanderlust”) led to the APA’s board of trustees to vote to
remove homosexuality as a pathological diagnosis from the DSM-III in
1973.114 The APA reclassified same-sex attractions as “Sexual
Orientation Disturbance,” meaning that, even though homosexuality was
no longer per se pathological, it remained a treatable disorder.115 In 1987,
the APA completely removed homosexuality from the DSM-IIIR.116 It
took until 2013 for the APA to depathologize so-called “gender identity
disorders,” reclassifying them as simply “gender dysphoria,” which was
intended to stress a change in approach but still allow access to
psychological resources.117 In 1990, the World Health Organization
(“WHO”) removed homosexuality from the International Classification
of Diseases.118 The WHO has yet to declassify being transgender as a
mental disorder.119
The preceding brief history of homosexuality in psychiatry—with a
particular emphasis on the 1960s—demonstrates that the prevailing view
of homosexuality among the most well-respected and well-educated
people of the time was that homosexuality was pathological.120 If one
adopts this view in the context of applying Title VII, the distinction
between “sex” discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination
becomes much clearer. When labeled a pathology, same-sex attraction is
easily divorced from gender, especially when seen as something that is
“unnatural” and “curable.” Perhaps, if sexual orientation had not been
assert that their orientation was not pathological. A defining moment came on June 27, 1969,
after a police raid on a gay bar in Greenwich Village in New York City provoked a riot.”).
114
Drescher, supra note 98, at 570-71. See Epstein, supra note 98, at 63 (“[T]he
nomenclature committee of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) set about
reassessing the profession’s dark characterization of homosexuality. Leading the charge was
psychiatrist Robert L. Spitzer of Columbia University . . . . As a result of his committee’s
recommendation, the term ‘homosexuality’ disappeared from the next edition of the DSM.
That hardly settled the matter, however. In a poll of psychiatrists conducted soon after the
APA’s leadership voted to make the change, 37 percent said they opposed the change, and
some accused the APA of ‘sacrificing scientific principles’ in the service of ‘civil rights’ —
in other words, of giving in to pressure.”)
115
Drescher, supra note 98, at 571.
116
Drescher, supra note 98, at 571.
117
Pam Belluck, W.H.O. Weighs Dropping Transgender Identity From List of Mental
Disorders, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/health/whotransgender-medical-disorder.html.
118
Drescher, supra note 98, at 571.
119
Belluck, supra note 117.
120
See Drescher, supra note 98, at 569.

CARACAPPA

358

2018

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

removed from the DSM in 1987 before the passage of the American’s
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) in 1990, discrimination based on sexual
orientation would be protected under the ADA as a disability. 121 It took
longer for the average American’s ideas about sexuality to shift, which is
likely why older judges did not initially take issue with drawing a line
between “sex” discrimination and discrimination based on sexual
orientation, but younger judges increasingly found the line impossible to
perceive.122 Now, it is not only unjust but impractical to expect judges to
attempt to separate sex discrimination from sexual orientation
discrimination by adopting the outmoded pathological view of same-sex
attraction.123
While the evolution in psychiatric thought is emblematic of the shift,
it alone does not do justice to the impressive change in Americans’
understanding of same-sex sexual behavior. A greater understanding of
the biology of sexual orientation was likely the most influential factor in
Americans’ shift in perception of same-sex attraction.124 The next section
will discuss the biological findings that have underlined the paradigmatic
shift in the professional and public perception of LGB Americans.125
This change in understanding helps explain why the line between “sex”
and sexual orientation has vanished, and demonstrates why sexual
orientation discrimination is, in fact, sex discrimination under Title VII.
Specifically, the next section will show how a growing body of scientific
evidence has demonstrated that sexuality and gender are inextricably
121
See Christine Michelle Duffy, Chapter 16: The Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 16-42 (Denise M. Visconti ed.,
2014) (“The ADA expressly states that homosexuality and bisexuality are not impairments
and, thus, not disabilities. Because homosexuality and bisexuality were no longer considered
a medical condition, having been removed from the DSM prior to the enactment of the ADA,
there was no need to include this exclusion in the ADA. Nonetheless, certain legislators
wanted this to be made explicit in the text of the law. Thus, there is no cause of action under
the ADA for discrimination against a person because of the individual’s sexual orientation.
[A]lthough homosexuality is also excluded from the ADA, a person with HIV, AIDS, or some
other disability is still protected by the ADA. [Despite the opposition, the final version of the
ADA bill did not exclude individuals with HIV or AIDS.]”).
122
See Garretson & Suhay, supra note 101 (explaining how new biological theories that
homosexuality was innate influenced a shift in the public perception of and attitudes toward
LGB people in the 1990s).
123
Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“Rather, when this Court
reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and
pragmatic considerations . . . for example, we may ask whether the rule has proven to be
intolerable simply in defying practical workability, . . . whether facts have so changed, or
come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification[.]”) (emphasis added).
124
See Garretson & Suhay, supra note 101.
125
See Garretson & Suhay, supra note 101.
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linked. This more-informed understanding of sexuality should, in part,
serve as an impetus for the federal courts to abandon the exclusionary,
narrow interpretation of “sex” in the Civil Rights Act.126 To that end, we
take up an age-old debate.
B. Nature vs. Nurture: Where Does the Science Stand?
The nature versus nurture debate has been argued since the sixteenth
century, involving great philosophers including John Locke and his
intellectual successor John Stuart Mills.127 Both were proponents of the
“blank slate” theory, which perceived the notion that acuity, talent, and
other human behaviors were in-born (a product of nature) as a privileged
philosophical tendency, and hypothesized that human differences were
purely a product of circumstance (nurture).128 These ideas formed the
core of “behaviorism”—a theory of behavior that dominated psychology
between the 1920s and 1960s.129
The theory of behaviorism
encompassed most, if not all human behavior, including sexual desires.130
As late as 1974, prominent psychologist B.F. Skinner advocated against
studying the human brain because he thought it was futile to try to
understand the behavior of an organism by studying its insides.131
Behaviorism not only dominated psychology, but pervaded the public
consciousness, appearing in popular childrearing books and giving rise to
many ideas now debunked.132 An example of just how influential
behaviorism was can be found in the still infamous belief that a parent
126

Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 350–51 (7th Cir. 2017) (“The
logic of the Supreme Court’s decisions, as well as the common-sense reality that it is actually
impossible to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation without discriminating on the
basis of sex, persuade us that the time has come to overrule our previous cases that have
endeavored to find and observe that line.”); id. at 357 (Posner, J., concurring) (“We
understand the words of Title VII differently not because we’re smarter than the statute’s
framers and ratifiers but because we live in a different era, a different culture. . . . I would
prefer to see us acknowledge openly that today we, who are judges rather than members of
Congress, are imposing on a half-century-old statute a meaning of ‘sex discrimination’ that
the Congress that enacted it would not have accepted. This is something courts do fairly
frequently to avoid statutory obsolescence and concomitantly to avoid placing the entire
burden of updating old statutes on the legislative branch. We should not leave the impression
that we are merely the obedient servants of the 88th Congress (1963–1965), carrying out their
wishes. We are not. We are taking advantage of what the last half century has taught.”). Cf.
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 854.
127
DAVID S. MOORE, THE DEVELOPING GENOME: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
EPIGENETICS 5 (2015); STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK STATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN
NATURE 18 (2002).
128
MOORE, supra note 127, at 5; PINKER, supra note 127, at 18-19.
129
PINKER, supra note 127, at 18-19.
130
PINKER, supra note 127, at 19.
131
PINKER, supra note 127, at 19-20.
132
PINKER, supra note 127, at 20.

CARACAPPA

360

2018

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

should never comfort a crying infant because, in doing so, the parent
rewards the child for crying, thereby encouraging the behavior.133
As an aside, the logical antithesis of behaviorism is “biological
determinism;” but this theory—that genetics entirely determine human
behavior—has never pervaded the public consciousness the same way
behaviorism did and, to an extent, still does.134 Biological determinism
remains more of an entertaining thought experiment, raising
philosophical questions about culpability and autonomy. 135
Today, an emerging sub-branch of biology—epigenetics—has been
changing Americans’ understanding about the nexuses of certain human
behaviors and has undermined the clichéd nature versus nurture debate
by demonstrating behavior may be a product of both.136 A word of
caution: this Note will not try to convince readers that sexual orientation
is absolutely hereditary (solely and exclusively determined by one’s
genes), but it will demonstrate that sexuality (including bisexuality) is a
largely innate and uncontrollable characteristic biologically linked to
one’s gender.137 This understanding of sexuality is at odds with the
pathological theory of homosexual attraction, which undergirded its
initial exclusion from the Civil Rights Act’s proscription on “sex”
discrimination. The goal of this Note is to flesh out the logical
underpinnings of the current exclusion and demonstrate why such
interpretations are out of step with shifts in biology, psychiatry, and
general social understanding—resulting in an impractical and unfair
133

PINKER, supra note 127, at 20.
MOORE, supra note 127, at 5; PINKER, supra note 127, at 122.
135
MOORE, supra note 127, at 5; PINKER, supra note 127, at 5. See Celeste M. Condit,
Nneka Ofulue, & Kristine M. Sheedy, Determinism and Mass-Media Portrayals of Genetics,
62 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 979, 983 (1998) (“Taken as a whole, this systematic study of the
character and degree of genetic determinism in popular media does not support statements by
critics that contemporary attention to genetics represents an increasingly biologistic
determinism.”). E.g., Law & Order: Special Victims Unit: Spiraling Down.
136
MOORE, supra note 127, at 5; PINKER, supra note 127, at 6. For a brief (five-minute)
primer on epigenetics, see Carlos Guerrero-Bosagna, What Is Epigenetics?, YOUTUBE (June
27, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_aAhcNjmvhc.
137
By “uncontrollable,” the Author does not mean to imply that all people with
homosexual inclinations cannot choose to maintain exclusively heterosexual relationships.
The debate is not about whether all LGB Americans have a choice, as sexuality is a spectrum.
Some can make the decision to deny same-sex desires, while others, specifically three to seven
percent of Americans, would condemn themselves to lives of celibacy. See Epstein, supra
note 98, at 65-66 (explaining that, while some self-identified homosexuals can carry on
consistent and enjoyable heterosexual relationships, it is likely due to the fact they are more
towards the center of the sexuality spectrum, while three to seven percent of the population is
exclusively homosexual and would not be able to make the same “choice”). The point is that,
wherever someone lies on that spectrum, his or her inclinations are irreproachable, because
they are not the product of choice. In other words, while some bisexuals could ignore their
same-sex attraction, such inclinations are natural, normal, and innate.
134
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distinction between putative types of the same form of discrimination.
What the discussion below will demonstrate is that, since the 1990s,
scientific research has revealed: (1) all homosexual sexual attraction—
including bisexuality—is likely inherited; (2) while inherited, these genes
only predispose someone to same-sex attraction, and various
environmental and other factors play a role in the presentation of one’s
sexuality; and (3) some people with this genetic predisposition (about
three to seven percent of the general population) cannot “choose”—much
less “change”—their sexual orientation, nor can their sexual orientation
be influenced by environmental factors (i.e., for this sub-group, their
sexual orientation is likely entirely inherited).138
First, it should be noted that DNA—our genetic “code”—is not like
a recipe where each of the listed ingredients impacts the ultimate
outcome.139 In other words, what is written in the ribbons of your DNA
is not always what you get.140 In more scientific terms, your genotype
(genetic code) is not necessarily your phenotype (the characteristics you
express).141 Gene expression is more complex and our genetic code
commonly carries traits that are not outwardly expressed because those
genes are either inactive (commonly known as “recessive”), or have not
been activated.142 Epigenetics is the study of gene expression, where
scientists try to discover what causes certain genes to be turned on or
off.143 The term “epigenetics” has also been colloquially adopted to refer
to what causes the expression or suppression of a particular gene, and
these “epigenetics” may be heritable (i.e., caused by someone’s
environment (nurture)) or inheritable (caused by genes alone (nature)).144
The study of epigenetics is helping better explain human behavior and its
insights “have the potential to change how we treat ourselves and other
people, so [its insights] are too important to remain the property of
biologists.”145 The implications of this new field of study and its findings
regarding sexual attraction are that sexual orientation, whether heritable

138

See infra pp. 24-27.
Cf. Yusuf Tutar, Pseudogenes, COMP. FUNCT. GENOMICS, May 2012, at 1 (“Noncoding
regions of human genome in general were thought to be nonfunctional and ‘junk,’ or of no
purpose DNA. . . . Pseudogenes originate from decay of genes that originated from
duplication through evolution.”).
140
See MOORE, supra note 127, at 11-12. Cf. Tutar, supra note 139, at 1.
141
MOORE, supra note 127, at 11-12.
142
MOORE, supra note 127, 11-14; Measuring Gene Expression, GENETIC SCI. LEARNING
CTR., http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/science/expression/ (last visited May 10, 2018).
143
Epigenetics: Fundamentals, WHAT IS EPIGENETICS, http://www.whatisepigenetics.
com/fundamentals/#fnref-12-1 (last visited May 10, 2018); MOORE, supra note 127, at 14.
144
MOORE, supra note 127, at 21-22, 164, 169.
145
MOORE, supra note 127, at 7.
139
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or inheritable, is biologically linked and, therefore, same-sex activity is
“natural” whether or not directly the product of “nature.” While
Americans are largely unaware of the specifics of these studies, since the
1990s, this growing body of research has in fact helped change
Americans’ views on sexual orientation,146 depathologizing same-sex
proclivities and bringing discrimination based on sexual orientation with
in the ambit of “sex” discrimination under Title VII.
The idea that a behavior can be “natural” without being a product of
“nature” is, understandably, a confusing concept. But a comparison
between the biological gender assignment of snakes and turtles provides
the perfect example of how characteristics with environmental nexuses
can still be “natural.”147 The gender of most types of snakes is determined
by sex chromosomes and, thus, in the traditional sense, the gender of any
given snake is determined by nature.148 Turtles, on the other hand, throw
a wrench in the traditional nature versus nurture dichotomy. As opposed
to snakes, the gender of any given turtle is based on the temperature of
the egg after fertilization during the so-called “critical period.”149 If, for
example, humans construct a lifeguard tower near a nest of sea turtles and
shadow cast by the tower cools a nest of turtle eggs enough so that all of
those turtles are born male, is the sex of those turtles a product of “nature”
or “nurture?”150 Scientists can even manipulate this phenomenon and
determine each turtle’s sex.151 Nevertheless, once the critical period
passes, each individual turtle’s sex is innate and unchangeable. 152 Does
this make turtle gender any less “natural?”153 Do the turtles bear any
responsibility?
146

See Garretson & Suhay, supra note 101.
Cf. SCOTT F. GILBERT, ENVIRONMENTAL SEX DETERMINATION, IN DEVELOPMENTAL
BIOLOGY 567 (6th ed. 2000), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK9989/.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
See id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Cf. GILBERT, supra note 147. Theoretically someone could still argue same-sex
behavior is unnatural and the cure lies in the natural solution of genetic modification. This
note posits that sexuality is as natural as eye color. See generally Guerrero-Bosagna, supra
note 136. Perhaps, one day, people will be able to choose their own, or more likely their
child’s, sexuality along with hair color, intelligence, strength, etc. But this Author leaves it
to the reader to struggle with the ethics of such a cure. See generally Kurzgesagt – In a
Nutshell, Genetic Engineering Will Change Everything Forever – CRISPR, YOUTUBE (Aug.
10, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jAhjPd4uNFY; Jennifer Doudna, Geneticist
and Co-inventor of CRISPR-Cas9, TED Talk London, England: How CRISPR Lets Us Edit
Our DNA (Sept. 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TdBAHexVYzc; Paul Knoep
fler, Biologist, TED Talk Vienna, Austria: The Ethical Dilemma of Designer Babies (Oct.
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nOHbn8Q1fBM.
147
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Undoubtedly, human sexual expression (a.k.a. orientation) is more
complex than sea turtle gender (though perhaps not more complex than
handedness, though that biological mystery also has yet to be solved). 154
Archeological evidence has shown that, despite consistent persecutions
and prejudice, homosexuality is a natural phenomenon present in almost
all human populations since prehistory.155 Familial patterns demonstrate
there is at least some “natural” (inheritable), biological basis.156
Lesbians, for example, are more likely to have homosexual sisters,
154

See Epstein, supra note 98, at 65 (“The way sexuality plays out is eerily similar to the
process by which people become left or right handed. It may sound contrary to common
sense, but scientific studies suggest that genes play a relatively small role in handedness; its
heritability — an estimate of what proportion of a trait’s variability can be accounted for by
genes — is only about [32%], compared with, say, [84%] for height and [95%] for head width.
Then why is more than 90 percent of the population righthanded? It is because of that cultural
‘push’ working again. Subtle and not so subtle influences make children favor their right
hand, and the flexibility they probably had when they were young is simply lost as they grow
up. Although they can still use the left hand, their handedness becomes so well established
that they would find it difficult, if not impossible, to become lefthanded.”). See also Ray
Blanchard et al., Interaction of Fraternal Birth Order and Handedness in the Development of
Male Homosexuality, 49 HORMONES AND BEHAV. 405, 411 (2006) (“[S]ome factor associated
with non-right-handedness increases the odds of homosexuality in first male births. This same
factor, however, prevents older brothers from increasing the odds of homosexuality in later
male births. If that interpretation is correct, the problem becomes one of identifying the
postulated factor. One possible candidate is fetal testosterone.”). Cf. Michael C. Corballis,
Left Brain, Right Brain: Facts and Fantasies, PLOS BIOL, Jan. 2014, at 6, 8 (“Handedness, at
least, is partly influenced by parental handedness, suggesting a genetic component, but genes
can’t tell the whole story. For instance some 23 percent of monozygotic twins, who share the
same genes, are of opposite handedness. . . . Although it may be the absence of [left-handed
accommodations] rather than [attempts at] reversal that can be linked to problems of social or
educational adjustment, left-handed individuals have often been regarded as deficient or
contrarian, but this may be based more on prejudice than on the facts.”).
155
Andrea Camperio Ciani, Umberto Battaglia, & Giovanni Zanzotto, Human
Homosexuality: A Paradigmatic Arena for Sexually Antagonistic Selection?, COLD SPRING
HARBOR PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY, Jan. 2015, at 3.
156
See Brendan P. Zietsch, Genetic Factors Predisposing to Homosexuality May Increase
Mating Success in Heterosexuals, 29 EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAV. 424, 429-31 (2008)
(“Our evidence is consistent with a mechanism whereby some genetic variation underlying
homosexuality could have been maintained over evolutionary time. The genes influencing
homosexuality have two effects. First, and most obviously, these genes increase the risk for
homosexuality, which ostensibly has decreased Darwinian fitness. Countervailing this,
however, these same genes appear to increase sex-atypical gender identity, which our results
suggest may increase mating success in heterosexuals. This mechanism, called antagonistic
pleiotropy, might maintain genes that increase the risk for homosexuality because they
increase the number of sex partners in the relatives of homosexuals. . . . Previous findings
suggesting that male homosexuals tend to come from bigger families are consistent with our
results and interpretation.”) (citations omitted); Camperio Ciani, Battaglia, & Zanzotto, supra
note 155, at 13 (“In conclusion, human [homosexuality] has likely different inheritance
systems in the two genders, although sexually antagonistic effects are likely driving forces for
any (epi)genetic HS heritable components affecting their transmission. The imprint of sexual
conflict appears well detectable in males, whereas in females it seems clouded by a number
of other unresolved questions.”).
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daughters, nieces, and female cousins by way of their paternal uncles.157
Gay men are more likely to have homosexual brothers, cousins, and
maternal uncles.158 This indicates homosexuality clusters in families, but
in different manners for both genders.159 Further, if one twin is
homosexual the other is much more likely to also be homosexual.160
Skeptics of a genetic link to sexuality note that homosexuality
violates the laws of natural selection (i.e., homosexuals do not reproduce
so, if the trait were inheritable, homosexuals should have died out through
natural selection).161 In fact, studies of reproduction rates do show
homosexuals reproduce at a significantly lower rate than
heterosexuals.162 But these studies have also shown mothers, aunts, and
grandmothers of homosexual or bisexual men have significantly higher
reproduction rates than average heterosexual female relative of
heterosexual men.163 Families of lesbians, on the other hand, do not
demonstrate the same patterns of increased fecundity, though the size of
their family in the three antecedent generations is significantly larger than
average.164 These correlations have given rise to the “sexual antagonism

157

Camperio Ciani, Battaglia, & Zanzotto, supra note 155, at 4.
Camperio Ciani, Battaglia, & Zanzotto, supra note 155, at 4.
159
Camperio Ciani, Battaglia, & Zanzotto, supra note 155, at 4.
160
Camperio Ciani, Battaglia, & Zanzotto, supra note 155, at 6-9 (discussing how
concordance rates between twins are too high to suggest there is no genetic link, and even
epigenetics could not alone explain the rate of concordance in twins). See Epstein, supra note
98, at 65; Sergey Gavrilets & William R. Rice, Genetic Models of Homosexuality: Generating
Testable Predictions, 273 PROC. R. SOC. B 3031 (2006); Zietsch, supra note 156, at 424.
161
See Zietsch supra note 156, at 424-25 (“In contemporary Western societies,
homosexual individuals tend to have fewer children than heterosexual individuals, and
lowered reproductive fitness in homosexuals may have been the case in ancestral times as
well. How, then, has homosexuality evolved, and how is it maintained in the population at a
relatively high frequency? Numerous theoretical explanations have been proposed for this
‘Darwinian paradox,’ . . . evidence suggests that homosexual men, compared to heterosexual
men, tend to come from larger families, which has been interpreted as greater fecundity in
relatives of homosexual men.”) (citations omitted). See also Camperio Ciani, Battaglia, &
Zanzotto, supra note 155, at 12 (“For male [homosexuality], about which there exist adequate
population data, the systematic mathematical analysis of the evolutionary propagation
mechanisms eliminates the possible Darwinian paradox associated with [homosexuality],
resolving it within the framework of sexual conflict [theory.]”).
162
Camperio Ciani, Battaglia, & Zanzotto, supra note 155, at 5.
163
Camperio Ciani, Battaglia, & Zanzotto, supra note 155, at 5-6; Andrea Camperio Ciani
& Elena Pellizzari, Fecundity of Paternal and Maternal Non-Parental Female Relatives of
Homosexual and Heterosexual Men, 7 PLOS ONE (Issue 12) at 4 (2012) (“In males, this
genetic factor increases the probability of homosexuality through androphilia, whereas in
females, it increases fecundity through androphilia, or better through a complex pattern of
behavior, personality and enhanced fertility that increases attraction from males and
fecundity.”).
164
Camperio Ciani, Battaglia, & Zanzotto, supra note 155, at 6.
158
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theory” of sexual orientation.165 In these correlations, scientists have
found evidence that the countervailing evolutionary benefit that
maintains homosexuality is an increased sex drive in other relatives—
hence increased fecundity.166 In other words, some members of the
family may be biologically “sacrificed” (i.e., born with homosexual
attraction) for the family as a whole to benefit from the trait.167 There are
also alternative theories like the “kin altruism theory,” which
hypothesizes that homosexual children give their families and
communities an evolutionary advantage because they serve their family
or community without adding members to it.168 Nevertheless, the sexual
antagonism theory has received the most empirical support.169
While there is a demonstrable genetic link for homosexuality, the
complexity in its presentation and maintenance in humans has given rise
to numerous theories attempting to explain exactly how homosexuality is
caused.170 Discussion of such theories goes well beyond the scope of this
165

Clara Moskowitz, Why Gays Don’t Go Extinct, LIVE SCIENCE (June 17, 2008),
http://www.livescience.com/2623-gays-dont-extinct.html (“‘This is the first time that a model
fits all our empirical data,’ said Andrea Camperio-Ciani, an evolutionary psychologist at the
University of Padova in Italy who led the study. ‘These genes work in a sexually antagonistic
way — that means that when they’re represented in a female, they increase fecundity , and
when they’re represented in a male, they decrease fecundity. It’s a trait that benefits one sex
at the cost of the other.’” (emphasis added)); Jessica L. Hoskins, Michael G. Ritchie, & Nathan
W. Bailey, A Test of Genetic Models for the Evolutionary Maintenance of Same-Sex Sexual
Behaviour, PROC. R. SOC. B, May 2015, at 5 (“Fecundity was influenced by both maternal and
paternal genotypes; it was higher in crosses where the mother had a high-[same-sex behavior]
genotype . . . , which is what the sexual antagonism model predicts . . . .” (emphasis added)).
166
See Andrea Camperio-Ciani, Francesca Corna, & Claudio Capiluppi, Evidence for
Maternally Inherited Factors Favouring Male Homosexuality and Promoting Female
Fecundity, 271 PROC. R. SOC. LOND. B 2217, 2220 (2004) (“Specifically, the assumption of
an X-linked allele beneficial to female fecundity, but detrimental to male fecundity, would fit
the pattern in our data. The existence of X-linked genetic factors associated with male
homosexuality has been suggested previously from DNA-linkage analysis of homosexual
brothers[.]”). See also Camperio Ciani, Battaglia, & Zanzotto, supra note 155, at 13 (“Sexual
antagonism for a multilocus factor with at least an X-linked locus is the selection mode
providing closest adherence of the models to the empirically known patterns for both
[homosexual] sexual orientation of males and higher-than-average fecundity for females in
their maternal line.”); Zietsch, supra note 156, at 431-32 (“Our results address both male and
female sexual orientations, and suggest a specific mechanism whereby pleiotropic genetic
factors predispose to nonheterosexuality and increase mating success in heterosexuals via
advantageous sex atypicality. While not explaining the birth-order effect, our results cannot
simply be a by-product of it.”).
167
See Zietsch, supra note 156, at 431-32.
168
See James O’Keefe, Director of the Charles & Barbara Duboc Cardio Health &
Wellness Center and the Preventive Cardiology service at Saint Luke’s Mid America Heart
Institute, TEDx Talk in Tallaght, Dublin: Homosexuality: It’s About Survival - Not Sex (Oct.
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Khn_z9FPmU; DAVID BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MIND 151 (2015 5th ed.).
169
Id.
170
Camperio Ciani, Battaglia, & Zanzotto, supra note 155, at 2 (“Since the 1990s, the
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note, and an exploration of why homosexuality presents in some and not
others who likely have the trait is unnecessary. The evidence that sexual
orientation—including bisexuality—has a genetic component (i.e., is
inheritable) has already shattered the assumptions underlying the
maintenance of the exclusion of sexual orientation from Title VII’s “sex”
protections, specifically, that deviation from heterosexual behavior is
pathological and unnatural.171 No matter the role of other factors on the
presentation of sexuality, genetics predispose some Americans to samesex attraction and, for smaller subset there is no choice in the matter.172
In short, no matter where someone falls on the spectrum of sexuality,
it is natural—not pathological.173 Even the Supreme Court has
recognized the intrinsic nature of sexuality, and it is time for the Federal
Courts of Appeals to follow suit.174
role of biological factors, both genetic and nongenetic, has come to light in relation to
[homosexuality]. The possible genetic components influencing human [homosexuality] have
since been explored empirically and theoretically. However, we emphasize at the outset that
a number of environmental factors (zygotic, prenatal, and postnatal) are known to affect
[homosexual] preference in either or both genders, such as maternal stress, mother estrogenprogestinics assumption during fetal development, fraternal birth order, as well as
environmental and social influences. Thus, genetic components can never be considered as
exclusive determinants of [homosexuality], and they should always be interpreted as acting
within the frame of an environmental background that may also significantly contribute to
same-sex preference in individuals.”) (citations omitted). See generally Francesca Iemmola
& Andrea C. Ciani, New Evidence of Genetic Factors Influencing Sexual Orientation in Men:
Female Fecundity Increase in the Maternal Line, 38 ARCH. OF SEX. BEHAV. 393-94 (2008).
171
See Drescher, supra note 98, at 571 (explaining how the prevailing view of
psychologists during the 1960s (when the Civil Rights Act was passed) was that
homosexuality was a pathology, and it was not until 1987 homosexuality was completely
removed as a treatable affliction); Garretson & Suhay, supra note 101.
172
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 350–51 (7th Cir. 2017)
(“Finally, the Court’s decision in Obergefell held that the right to marry is a fundamental
liberty right, protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court wrote that ‘[i]t is now clear that the challenged laws burden the
liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that they abridge central
precepts of equality.’ . . . [T]his court sits en banc to consider what the correct rule of law is
now in light of the Supreme Court’s authoritative interpretations, not what someone thought
it meant one, ten, or twenty years ago. The logic of the Supreme Court’s decisions, as well
as the common-sense reality that it is actually impossible to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation without discriminating on the basis of sex[.]”) (citations omitted). See Camperio
Ciani, Battaglia, & Zanzotto, supra note 155, at 13. See also Epstein, supra note 98, at 65-66
(“[I]t is reasonable to assume that most of the people who currently live as homosexuals were
probably close to the gay end of the continuum to begin with; in other words, they probably
have strong genetic tendencies toward homosexuality. Even though the evidence is clear that
some gays can switch their sexual orientation, the vast majority probably cannot — or at least
not comfortably. If you doubt that — and assuming that you are righthanded — try eating
with your left hand for a day or two, and good luck with your soup.”).
173
Epstein, supra note 98, at 65-66.
174
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (“And their immutable nature
dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound commitment.”).
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IV. THE THREE OBSTACLES TO INCLUSION
The following section addresses each of the three major reasons
courts maintain the exclusion of sexual orientation from the protections
of Title VII, and demonstrates why the courts ought to abandon the
exclusion.
A. The Legislative History: The Inclusion of “Sex” Was More
Than A Joke
The first obstacle to the inclusion of LGB individuals within the
protections of the Civil Rights Act is the legislative history surrounding
the addition of “sex” as a protected class.175 Courts still rely on the
narrative that the Act was primarily intended to remedy racial
discrimination and that “sex” was thrown in at the final hour as an attempt
to thwart the Act’s passage.176 Based on this narrative, courts conclude:
“Congress had a narrow view of sex in mind when it passed the Civil
Rights Act.”177
But scholar Robert Bird points out that this common reading of the
legislative history is belied by the dauntless efforts of those supporting
women’s rights, especially the National Women’s Party, which, with
great political acuity, successfully lobbied for the inclusion of “sex” in

175
See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 853 F.3d
339 (7th Cir. 2017). Cf. Bird, supra note 4, at 142-43 (“The most harmful, and most common,
misuse of the legislative history is found in judicial efforts to restrict coverage of the ban on
sex discrimination. Judges have applied such restrictions in spite of later congressional and
judicial conduct affirming the broad remedial goals of Title VII. Judges have used legislative
history to restrain uniformly-accepted doctrine and to restrict expansions of sex discrimination
law beyond established frontiers.”). E.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th
Cir. 1984) (“This sex amendment was the gambit of a congressman seeking to scuttle adoption
of the Civil Rights Act. The ploy failed and sex discrimination was abruptly added to the
statute’s prohibition against race discrimination. The total lack of legislative history . . .
coupled with the circumstances of the amendment’s adoption clearly indicates that Congress
never considered nor intended [the Act] apply to anything other than the traditional concept
of sex.”) (citations omitted).
176
See Bird, supra note 4, at 137-38.
177
Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086. E.g., Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750
(8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977). See
Bird, supra note 4, at 143-44 (“[M]isreadings of the legislative history have thwarted attempts
to expand sex discrimination to protect transsexuals and to prohibit same-sex sexual
harassment.”). But see Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 142 (2d Cir. 2018)
(Lynch, J., dissenting) (“If some sexist legislators considered the inclusion of sex
discrimination in the bill something of a joke, or perhaps a poison pill to make civil rights
legislation even more controversial, evidently no one thought that adding sexual orientation
to the list of forbidden categories was worth using even in that way. Nor did those who
opposed the sex provision in Title VII include the possibility that prohibiting sex
discrimination would also prevent sexual orientation discrimination in their parade of
supposed horribles.”).
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the Civil Rights Act.178 To read the amendment’s introduction by
conservative Democrat and staunch Civil Rights opponent Howard Smith
as simply a ploy to defeat the Act’s passage neglects the complex political
maneuvering by a traditionally disenfranchised group to garner
employment protections.179 In fact, it is evident that Congressman Smith
genuinely preferred a bill that included “sex” as a protected category,
because he feared the Act would otherwise give special protections to
black women at the expense of white women.180 Ultimately, the House
of Representatives passed the Act with the addition and Congresswoman
Martha Griffiths—a trailblazer who was the first woman to serve on the
House Committee on Ways and Means—championed the controversial
amendment through the Senate.181
Narrowly interpreting the term “sex” based on the faulty narrative
also appears to contradict Supreme Court precedent. In footnote nine of
Price Waterhouse, the Court addressed the dearth of legislative history
concerning the addition of the class “sex” to the Act and, while noting
legislators focused primarily on race, stated: “We do not, however, limit
[the legislators’] statements to the context of race, but instead we take
them as general statements on the meaning of Title VII.” 182 In the same
footnote, the Court even addressed the common narrative surrounding the
inclusion of “sex” as a protected class, referring to its addition as a
“somewhat bizarre path,” but explaining the narrative was unpersuasive
178

Bird, supra note 4, at 161.
Bird, supra note 4, at 149-50 (“[T]he [National Women’s Party (“NWP”)] framed its
request for the amendment in terms that would benefit [Smith’s] agenda. On December 10,
1963, the NWP wrote to Smith, stating that, ‘[t]his single word “sex” would divert some of
the high pressure, which is being used to force this Bill through without proper attention to
all the effects of it.’ Smith appeared hesitant at first, but he eventually warmed to the idea of
adding the ‘sex’ amendment. In a rare appearance on ‘Meet the Press’, a televised interview
program, Elizabeth May Craig, a well-known journalist, feminist, and prominent member of
the NWP, questioned Smith. After Ms. Craig questioned him on the issue, Smith hinted that
he might offer an Amendment in the Civil Rights Bill prohibiting sex discrimination in
employment.”).
180
Bird, supra note 4, at 157-58 (“I put a question to you in behalf of the white women
of the United States. Let us assume that two women apply for the same job and both of them
are equally eligible, one a white woman and one a Negro woman. The first thing that
employer will look at will be the provision with regard to the records he must keep. If he does
not employ that colored woman and has to make that record, that employer will say, ‘Well,
now, if I hire the colored woman I will not be in any trouble, but if I do not hire the colored
woman and hire the white woman, then the Commission is going to be looking down my
throat and will want to know why I did not. I may be in a lawsuit.’ That will happen as surely
as we are here this afternoon. You all know it.”) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2583 (1964)
(remarks of Reps. Tuten, Pool, Andrews, and Rivers)).
181
Bird, supra note 4, at 155-56, 161; Martha Griffiths and the Equal Rights Amendment,
NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/griffiths. (last visited May
10, 2018).
182
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 n.9 (1989).
179
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in suggesting that the legislators’ statements about race were irrelevant in
application to gender discrimination.183 The Court held “the statute on
its face treats each of the enumerated categories exactly the same.”184
These statements by the Court suggest a narrow interpretation of “sex” is
inapposite even if one believes the common story surrounding the
legislative history. In Price Waterhouse, the Court went on to vastly
expand protections against sex discrimination by establishing the sex
stereotyping theory, undoubtedly a broad reading of the term “sex.”185
Further evincing the supremacy of a broad interpretation of “sex,”
the Court in Oncale held “sex” discrimination under Title VII fully
encompassed same-sex harassment.186 The late Justice Antonin Scalia,
writing for the majority, explained that, even though male-on-male sexual
harassment was certainly not the principal evil Congress was concerned
with when it passed the Civil Rights Act, “statutory prohibitions often go
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of
our legislators by which we are governed.”187
B. Congressional Intent—The 88th Congress Originally Intended
Broad Classes
The second reason federal courts have been hesitant to overturn past
precedent and move to include sexual orientation within Title VII’s
protections against “sex discrimination” is that Congress has, on
numerous occasions, failed to amend the Civil Rights Act and explicitly
extend employment protections to LGBT Americans.188 The most recent
failure came with the death of the Equality Act in the 114th Congress
(January 2015 to January 2017), which would have amended the Civil
Rights Act, Fair Housing Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and jury
selection standards to include prohibitions on sexual orientation
discrimination.189 But these failures on Congress’s part should prove no

183

Id.
Id.
185
Herz, supra note 42.
186
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
187
Id.
188
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 853 F.3d
339 (7th Cir. 2017) (“In short, Congress’ failure to act to amend Title VII to include sexual
orientation is not from want of knowledge of the problem. And as a result, our understanding
in Ulane that Congress intended a very narrow reading of the term ‘sex’ when it passed Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, so far, appears to be correct.”). See Soucek, supra note 50, at
721-22.
189
Summary: H.R.3185 — 114th Congress (2015-2016), GOVTRACK.US, https://www
.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr3185/summary (last visited May 10, 2018).
184
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impediment to the inclusion of sexual orientation within “sex” given the
erosion of assumptions underlying the original exclusion of sexual
orientation.190 The Supreme Court has even stated, “[c]ongressional
inaction lacks ‘persuasive significance’ because ‘several equally tenable
inferences’ may be drawn from such inaction, ‘including the inference
that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.’”191
This Note submits that Title VII has always incorporated sexual
orientation in the broad class of “sex,” but society has mistakenly
excluded it because of the assumption that homosexuality attraction was
a psychological malady—rather than natural sexual diversity.
The EEOC’s decision in Baldwin v. Foxx addressed this very
issue.192 The Commission explained that the concerns over congressional
inaction stem from the notion that the inclusion of sexual orientation in
the Act’s protections would effectively create a new class. 193 The
Commission pointed out a “new class” was not created with the inclusion
of “interracial couples” within the Act’s protections against racial
discrimination, or with the inclusion of “non-believers” in the Act’s
protection of “religion,” or with the inclusion of “mothers” in Act’s
protections of “sex.”194 Rather than “adding” new classes to the Act by
judicial fiat, each of these subgroups was afforded protection through
logical extension of the Act’s original principles.195 Initial exclusion of
LGB plaintiffs is, perhaps, understandable considering the old
assumptions widely held at the time of the Act’s passage. 196 But today,
sexual orientation is clearly within the original principles of the Act and
the modern exclusion of sexual orientation—a natural subset of gender—
from the “sex” class is illogical.197
Moreover, the Supreme Court held that Congress intended “to strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in
190
Cf. Drescher, supra note 98, at 572 (“Most importantly, in medicine, psychiatry, and
other mental health professions, removing the diagnosis from the DSM led to an important
shift from asking questions about ‘what causes homosexuality?’ and ‘how can we treat it?’ to
focusing instead on the health and mental health needs of LGBT patient populations.”).
191
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (quoting U.S. v.
Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962)). See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 130 (2d
Cir. 2018) (“This theory of ratification by silence is in direct tension with the Supreme Court’s
admonition that ‘subsequent legislative history is a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of
an earlier Congress,’ particularly when ‘it concerns, as it does here, a proposal that does not
become law.’).
192
Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *27 (EEOC July 15, 2015).
193
Id.
194
See id. at *27-29.
195
See id.
196
See Drescher, supra note 98, at 569.
197
See Epstein, supra note 98, at 65-66.
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employment.”198 Discrimination against female employees because they
have wives while leaving male employees undisturbed is unlawful
disparate treatment under Title VII. Congress’s original intent was broad,
and this broad intent to protect against disparate treatment has always
included sexual orientation as we know it today. The confusion about
whether Title VII’s protections can be “extended” to sexual orientation
discrimination comes from the fact that society had mistakenly thought
homosexuality was pathological fifty years ago. 199
Imagine if the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1692 instead of 1964.
At that time, the people of Salem believed “witches” were conspiring
with the Devil to destroy humanity.200 If twenty years passed and society
came to realize Wiccans—practicing pagans who draw on the old
traditions of witchcraft—were not evil magicians, but adherents to an
unfamiliar religion, would Congress have had to amend the Civil Rights
Act to specifically include them within its proscription on religious
discrimination?201 A modern example proves this point just as well: must
Congress amend the Civil Rights Act to include Scientology? Surely the
88th Congress would not have thought the belief human souls were
brought to Earth by an evil space warlord named Xenu was a religion.202
This is not a debate between judicial originalism and activism. The 88th
Congress intended the Civil Rights Act’s identified classes to be broad
enough to cover whatever fell or would fall within their scope, regardless
of whether the specific subgroup was known or prominent at the time.
C. Stare Decisis: A Decision to Stand By?
The final reason relied on by federal courts in maintaining the
exclusion of sexual orientation is the principle of stare decisis. 203 But as
198

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).
See Drescher, supra note 98, at 569; DSM-II § 302 (Am. Psychiatric Ass’n 2d ed.)
(1968).
200
Leonie Roderick, The Trials of Being a Witch Today: Society Doesn’t Burn Witches
at the Stake Anymore, But That Doesn’t Mean Life Is Easy for Those Who Come Out of the
Broom Closet, BROADLY (Oct. 28, 2014), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/xye9zz/thetrials-of-being-a-witch-today; Jess Blumberg, A Brief History of the Salem Witch Trials: One
Town’s Strange Journey from Paranoia to Pardon, SMITHSONIAN (Oct. 23, 2007),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/a-brief-history-of-the-salem-witch-trials175162489/.
201
See Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 249 Ga. 348, 354 (Ga. 1982) (“. . .
demonology and stereotypical witchcraft most emphatically do not constitute religion . . . .”).
202
Cf. Janet Reitman, Inside Scientology: Unlocking the Complex Code of America’s
Most Mysterious Religion, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 23, 2006, 1:16 PM),
https://web.archive.org/web/20080622123603/http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/93
63363/inside_scientology/print.
203
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 853 F.3d
339 (7th Cir. 2017); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000) (“We likewise do
199
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discussed in Sections I.A. and I.C., the Supreme Court has time and time
again endorsed a broad interpretation of the term “sex.”204 In fact, the
Court has never endorsed a narrow interpretation of “sex,” and has
explicitly rejected it with respect to the exclusion of same-sex harassment
claims and claims based on sex stereotypes. 205
Moreover, adherence to the narrow interpretation, the validity of
which has been dubious for at least the past thirty years, defies principles
of constitutional avoidance. With the Obergefell decision in 2015, courts
that interpret the Civil Rights Act to exclude sexual orientation put the
Act on a collision course with the Equal Protection and Due Process
clauses.206
While it is beyond the scope of this Note to explore possible Due
Process and Equal Protection implications of excluding LGB people from
the Act’s protection, there is a potential argument that reading LGB
people out of the Act, given our nation’s improved understanding of
sexual minorities, transgresses either or both of these constitutional
guarantees. In brief, the Supreme Court held in Obergefell that excluding
homosexual Americans from marriage violated both the Equal Protection
and Due Process rights by depriving them of a fundamental liberty
interest because of their gender or sexuality. 207 By excluding LGB
Americans from the province of the Civil Rights Act and depriving them
of employment protections afforded to others simply because of their
sexual orientation or the gender of their partners, one could constitute a
similar hybrid Equal Protection and Due Process argument.208 In fact, the
Chief Judge of the Second Circuit recently suggested this very point in
Anonymous v. Omnicom Grp., Inc.209 Citing to Loving v. Virginia, the
case in which the Supreme Court found an Equal Protection violation
where Virginia law treated interracial couples equally but less favorably
than non-interracial couples, the Chief Judge found “the same logic
suggests that it is sex discrimination to treat all individuals in same-sex
not see how Oncale changes our well-settled precedent that ‘sex’ refers to membership in a
class delineated by gender.”).
204
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-40 (1989) (“We take these words
to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
205
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239-40; Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
206
Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
207
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05. It should be noted that the Supreme Court is not
absolutely clear whether its ruling was based on sexuality (i.e., Equal Protection) or just Due
Process. Nevertheless, either “fills the gap,” so to speak, when it comes to the Equal
Protection and Due Process Rights of LGB Americans.
208
Cf. id.
209
See Anonymous v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2017) (Katzman,
C.J., concurring).

CARACAPPA

2018] SEX AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION

2018

373

relationships the same, but less favorably than individuals in oppositesex relationships.”210
Whether Price Waterhouse or, more recently, Obergefell, the
Supreme Court seems to have rejected the narrow interpretation of “sex”
and, implicitly, the exclusion of LGB Americans from the protection of
the Act.211 In this case, for the federal courts to stand by things decided
would be a grave mistake that not only perpetuates harm against LGB
Americans, but also threatens the constitutionality of half-century old
legislation that has transformed the fabric of working life in the United
States.
Alternatively, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court opined
that an old rule may be abandoned if the facts have changed or have
“come to be seen so differently” as to rob the rule of justification or if the
rule proves intolerable because it defies practical workability.212
Considering the shift in social, psychological, and scientific
understanding, a broad interpretation of “sex” would be in line with
Casey. As described in Section I.C., courts are in agreement that the line
between sexual orientation discrimination and sex discrimination is either
so elusive that is has yet to be found, or it simply does not exist. 213 It
defies practical workability to require that courts make a distinction that
does not exist in order to determine whether or not an individual plaintiff
may state a claim under Title VII. And, as discussed in Section II.A. and

210

Id.
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-40 (1989); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05.
212
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (“Rather, when this Court
reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and
pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with
the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a
prior case. Thus, for example, we may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable
simply in defying practical workability, . . . whether facts have so changed, or come to be
seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification,
[example omitted].”) (emphasis added).
213
E.g., Hively, v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 853
F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Whether the line is nonexistent or merely exceedingly difficult to
find, it is certainly true that the attempt to draw and observe a line between the two types of
discrimination results in a jumble of inconsistent precedents.”); Videckis v. Perpperdine
Univ., No. CV 15-00298 DDP (JCx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169187, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Dec.
14, 2015) (“Simply put, the line between sex discrimination and sexual orientation
discrimination is ‘difficult to draw’ because that line does not exist, save as a lingering and
faulty judicial construct.”); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009)
(“[T]he line between sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination ‘because of sex’
can be difficult to draw.”); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066-67 (7th
Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring) (“The origin of this curious distinction, which would be
very difficult to explain to a lay person (an indication, often and I think here, that the law is
indeed awry)[.]”).
211
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II.B., the facts surrounding the distinction have come to be seen so
differently over the course of the past forty years that it has robbed the
old exclusionary rule of any meaning.214 No longer is it assumed that
homosexuals or bisexuals are deviants choosing to engage in wicked
behavior—no longer do most believe deviation from heterosexuality is a
curable pathology.215
This quote from the landmark gay rights case of Lawrence v. Texas
is both instructive and plaintive: “[T]imes can blind us to certain truths
and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper
in fact serve only to oppress.”216
V. CONCLUSION
Each of the three major justifications supporting the exclusion of
LGB Americans from the protections of the Civil Rights Act is a
judicially created Potemkin Village. First, the legislative history should
not be used to justify a narrow interpretation of “sex” because it neglects
the richer history surrounding the inclusion of the term.217 And, even if
believed, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated “sex” should not be read
any differently than race or religion, based on the legislative history. 218
The Supreme Court has plainly rejected the narrow interpretation of “sex”
in Price Waterhouse and Oncale.219 Second, inclusion of LGB people
within the Act’s protections would not effectively amend the Act because
other subgroups of protected classes were afforded protection under the
Act without changing the Civil Rights Act’s character.220 Further,
Congress’s original intent in creating the Act’s classes was broad in order
to accommodate all that fell, and all that would fall, within the ambit of
the five named classes.221 This is not a case where courts must choose
between originalism and activism—they must simply apply the 88th
Congress’s original intent in an era when society recognizes sexual
orientation as a natural variation and not a pathology. Finally, when it
comes to the narrow interpretation of “sex,” courts should not rely on the
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principles of stare decisis, as the judicially-created exclusionary rule’s
precedential status is both dubious and raises Equal Protection and Due
Process questions.222
Preserving the exclusion of sexual orientation from the Civil Rights
Act’s protections against “sex” discrimination is impractical, illogical,
and a misreading of the 88th Congress’s original intent. It is imperative
courts cease excluding LGB Americans from the protections of the Civil
Rights Act, as such exclusion works a grave and continuing harm that
defies the Act’s core principles.223
“A man will be imprisoned in a room with a door that is unlocked
and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than
push it.”224 As the Seventh Circuit wondered, “Perhaps the writing is on
the wall.”225 Indeed, it is.226
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